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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD D. MADSEN and NANCY
MADSEN, his wife, BOYD A.
SWENSEN and BEATRICE SWENSEN,
his wife, BLAINE ANDERSON and
SHEREE ANDERSON, his wife,
HOPE A. HILTON, CYNTHIA
HILTON, RALPH M HILTON,
GENE HELLAND and the MIDDLE
EAST FOUNDATION,
Case No. 19704
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
vs.
MIRVIN D. BORTHICK, W. SMOOT
BRIMHALL, and JOHN DOES I to
V, being former Commissioners
of the Utah Department of
Financial Institutions,
Defendants and
Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

MATURE QF THE CASE
This is an action by several investors in Grove
Finance Company against former Comissioners of the Utah
Department of Financial Institutions, to recover the full
amount of their investment which was lost when Grove Finance
became insolvent.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Third District Court, Honorable David B. Dee,

granted Respondents1 motion for summary judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT PN APPEAL
Appellants seek a reversal of the order granting
summary judgment and remand to the district court.
STATEMENT PF FACTS
Respondents generally agree with the Statement of
Facts in Appellants1 Brief, other than disagreeing to some
extent as to the basis of the Court's ruling in Madsen v.
Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah, 1983) (discussed in Point
II, infill

In addition, however, Respondents would point

out that, to this day, Appellants have filed no notice of
claim in this matter, pursuant to Sections 63-30-11 and -12
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (R.64); and that
Appellants filed the same complaint in this matter as was
filed in the earlier Maflsen Vt BQEthJcK, g.upra (hereinafter "Madsen I"), except that in this action they have
(1) named Commissioners Borthick and Brimhall instead of
Commissioner Borthick and the State as defendants (see
paragraph 2 in each Complaint); (2) claimed that the
identical acts now constitute "gross negligence" (see
paragraph 5 in each Complaint); (3) dropped their class
action allegations; and (4) alleged that a duty to supervise
Grove Finance Company existed under both Title 7 (as
previously alleged) and Title 70B of the Utah Code (see
Appellants1 "Alternative Cause of Action" in Complaint in
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instant action).

The Complaint from Madsen I (supplement

to record herein) is appended hereto as Appendix A, and the
Complaint from this action (R.2-8) as Appendix B.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. RESPONDENTS ARE IMMUNE FROM
SUIT IN THIS ACTION ON PRECISELY THE
SAME GROUNDS SET OUT IN MADSEN V,
BORTHICK, BECAUSE THIS SUIT IS IN
SUBSTANCE THE SAME SUIT AND COMES TO THE
COURT IN THE SAME POSTURE AS THE EARLIER
ACTION.

in Maflgen Vt BorthicKr

&HSL&,

658 P.2d 627

(Utah, 1983), this Court held that:
(1)

Governmental supervision of financial

institutions is a "governmental function" to which
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (U.C.A.
63-30-1, et seq.) apply;
(2) Since Appellants did not comply with U.C.A.
63-30-11 and -12, the notice requirement of the Immunity
Act, their Complaint against the State was properly
dismissed;
(3)

Under U.C.A. 63-30-4, a "governmental

official or employee can only be sued in a representative
capacity when the governmental entity is liable," JUL. at
633,

so dismissal as to Commissioner Borthick in his

representative capacity was proper; and
(4) Dismissal as to Commissioner Borthick in his
individual capacity was also proper because, under U.C.A.
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63-30-4, no allegation was made in the Complaint of "gross
negligence, fraud, or malice."
The instant case comes to the Court in precisely
the same posture as Madsen I, with no notice of claim ever
having been filed (R. 64). Appellants employ several
ingenious semantic dodges in their present Complaint in
order to circumvent the Court1s ruling in Madsen I.

but

as a matter of law, still fail to state a valid claim.
A.

THIS ACTION AGAINST STATE EMPLOYEES
IS BARRED BY U.C.A. 63-30-4, SINCE THE
SAME ACTION AGAINST THE STATE HAS
PREVIOUSLY FAILED.
U.C.A. 63-30-4(3), as amended by the 1983 Utah

Legislature, states:
The remedy against a governmental
entity or its employee for an injury
caused by an act or omission which
occurs during the performance of such
employee's duties, within the scope of
employment, or under color of authority

is. . . . exclusive cf any ,Qther civil
action <?r. p.KQce.e.<3iogfryreason, .of the
same subject matter against the employee
. . . whose act or omission gave rise to
the claim, unless the employee cited or
failed to act through fraud or malice.
(Emphasis added.)
The 1983 Legislature deleted the words "gross negligence"
prior to "fraud or malice" in the final clause.
In Madsen I. Appellants sued the State of Utah
to recover the amount of their investment in Grove Finance
Company.

That action failed.

Appellants may not now

maintain this action against Commissioners Borthick and
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Brimhall, because their "remedy" against the State was
"exclusive of any other civil action" against state
employees.

Both the clear statutory language and common

sense dictate that a separatef substantively identical cause
of action may not be brought against public employees where
it has been previously held that no cause of action exists
against the public entity which employed them.
Appellants seek to circumvent this provision by
alleging that Respondents are named in their individual
rather than representative capacity, that the pre-1983
statutory language applies here, and that their claim of
"gross negligence" makes this case a valid exception to the
statutory rule.
B.

These points are not well-taken.

RESPONDENTS IN THIS ACTION ARE CLEARLY
NAMED IN A REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY AND,
SINCE APPELLANTS HAVE NEVER FILED A
NOTICE OF CLAIM, THIS ACTION MUST BE
DISMISSED UNDER THE COURT'S HOLDING IN

MAPSEN I.
In Madsen I, this Court relied on the pre-1983
versions of U.C.A. 63-30-11 and -12, the notice-of-claim
statutes:
63-30-11. Any person having a claim for
injury to person or property against a
governmental entity or its employee

ghallr before maintaining an action
untier this act, .file a written notice of
£ialm with such entity for appropriate
relief including money damages. The
notice of claim shall . . . be directed
and delivered to the responsible
governmental entity within the time
prescribed in section 63-30-12 or
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63-30-13, as applicable.
•

• •

63-30-12. A .claim against,-the state is
fr.arrefl unless.notice of Plaint is filefl
with the attorney general and the agency
concerned within one .year after the
cause of action arises. (Emphasis by
Court, 658 P.2d at 630).
The Court ruled that dismissal of Madsen I as to the State
was proper "on the basis of governmental immunity and
noncompliance with the notice requirement."

JLsL. at 632.

As to Commissioner Borthick, the Court cited the
final paragraph of U.C.A. 63-30-4:
An employee may be joined in an action
against a governmental entity in a
representative capacity if the act or
omission complained of is one for which
the governmental entity may be liable,

but no employee shall be. .helfl
personally liable for acts .or omissions
.occurring fluting .the performance of .the
employee's duties > « t, unless .it, is
established that the, .employee acted .or
failed to actflueto gross .negligencei
fraufl or malice,
658 P.2d at 633.)

(Emphasis by Court,

(Again, the 1983 Legislature removed the words "gross
negligence" in the final clause.)
In the instant action, Commissioners Borthick and
Brimhall are clearly named in a representative capacity, as
former Commissioners of Financial Institutions for the State
of Utah.

Appellants1 startling assertion that "It]he

respondents in this action are individuals being sued in
their individual capacity only" (Appellants1 Brief, p. 8) is
thoroughly belied by the Complaint.
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The action names

Commissioner Borthick and Brimhall and John Does I to V,
"being former Commissioners of the Utah Department of
Financial Institutions11 (R.2).

Paragraph 2 of the Complaint

identifies the John Does as former commissioners, and
states:
This allegation includes each
commissioner who has held office from
the incorporation of Grove Finance to
the insolvency of Grove Finance*
(R.2-3).
Furthermore, the entire tenor of the Complaint is
that Respondents purportedly failed to fulfill a statutory
duty to inspect and regulate the financial affairs of Grove
Finance (cf. paragraphs 4 and 12-14 at R. 3-5, 6). Of
course, the idea that Respondents had any such duty or
authority in a personal capacity is ludicrous, and the
Complaint makes no such pretense.

It was also undisputed

on the record before the District Court in this matter that
neither Respondent ever had any dealings or involvement of
any kind with Grove Finance in any private capacity, and
that any activity in which either Respondent ever engaged
relating to the inspection or supervision of financial
institutions occurred within the scope of his employment as
Commissioner of Financial Institutions (R.53, 55).
This Court has previously stated:
The substance of the pleading and the
nature of the issues which are raised,
rather than the pleader's designation of
the cause of action, control the issue.
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LQffl Vt ShflWr 665 P.2d 1288, 1290
(Utah, 1983).
In this case, only Respondents1 official activities as State
officers are advanced as a basis for liability; Respondents
are clearly named in a i.epteisentetive capacity, and
Appellants1 semantic wand-waving does not make it otherwise.
Since the State is not liable in this matter, as
the Court held in Madsen I, State officials named in their
representative capacity for official acts or omissions
cannot be sued, 658 P.2d at 633.

Precisely the same grounds

on which the Court relied in the earlier case mandate the
affirming of the District Court's action in this case.
C.

THE 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY ACT ARE REMEDIAL IN NATURE AND
APPLY TO BAR THIS ACTION, EVEN IF IT IS
ASSUMED ARGUENDO THAT RESPONDENTS ARE
NAMED IN A PERSONAL CAPACITY.
Next, Appellants argue that an allegation of

fgross negligence" in their Complaint is sufficient, under
the pre-1983 statutes, to obviate the notice-of-claim
requirement of U.C.A. 63-30-11 and -12 and to circumvent the
language of U.C.A. 63-30-4 barring personal liability
(Appellants1 Brief, pp. 8-10, 12-14).

As to the claim

statute, Appellants rely on what was the second paragraph of
U.C.A. 63-30-11, prior to 1983:
Service of the notice of claim upon an
employee of a governmental entity is not
a condition precedent to the
commencement of an action or special
proceeding against such person. If an
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action or special proceeding is
commenced against the employee, but not
against the governmental entity, service
of the notice of claim upon the
governmental entity is required only if
the entity has a statutory duty to
indemnify such person.
Appellants argue that there is no obligation to indemnify an
employee if it is established that he acted with gross
negligence, under U.C.A. 63-48-3(4) as that section existed
prior to 1983, and that therefore no notice of claim was
required in this case (Appellants1 Brief, p. 10).
The 1983 Legislature made the following changes
which pertain to this action:

1. Deleted the phrase "gross .negligence".from
U.C.A, 63-30-4, clarifying the broad applicability of the
exclusive remedy rule and the fairly narrow grounds on which
public employees may be personally liable;
2.

Amended U>CtA« 63-3Q-U to clarify the fact

that a notice of claim must be served upon the State if, as
here, a claim is asserted against a State employee for an
act or omission occurring during the performance of his
duties (compare 1983 and pre-1983 versions in Appendix C
herein);

3. Repealed in toto the former second paragraph
ftf.UtCtAt 63-3Q-Ilr set out £U£L&, the section of the
notice requirement upon which Appellants rely; and

4. Recodified U,C,At 63-48-3 .as.U.,.CtA, 63-3Q-36i

-9-

an<3 in so flpingr. repealed .UnCtAt 63-48-3(4?* upon which
Appellants rely for their contention that the State has no
duty to indemnify Respondents.
Respondents submit that each of these changes is
remedial in naturer not creating or repealing substantive
rights, but setting forth with greater clarity the notice
procedure which must be followed in bringing suit against
public entities or employees within the scope of employment,
and the bounds of potential liability in such cases as
between entities and their employees.

The same substantive

causes of action that existed prior to the amendments still
exist, against either the entity or the employee;
modifications in the notice requirement or the duty of
public entities to indemnify employees do not affect these
substantive rights.
Remedial statutory amendments, providing only wa
different mode or form of procedure for enforcing
substantive right . . . are generally applied
retrospectively to accrued or pending actions to further the
Legislature's remedial purpose."

Pilghet y, St3t6r

Department Qf social Servige&r 663 P.2d 450, 455 (Utah,
1983).

Foil v. Ballinoer, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah, 1979), a

case upon which Appellants rely, which considered the
limitation and notice-of-claim provisions of the Utah Health
Care Malpractice Act, stands for the proposition that
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remedial amendments which clarify existing procedural
requirements for the bringing of particular actions, apply
"to accrued, pending, and future actions." ±&. at 151,
citing Boijgpfski y, JfrCQfrsep, 36 Utah 165, 104 P. 117
(1909).
This action was filed on July 20, 1983
(Appellants' Brief, pp. 2, 4), well after the 1983
amendments to the Governmental Immunity Act were in effect.
The amendments are remedial in nature, and clearly bar the
instant action.
D.

EVEN IF IT IS ASSUMED THAT THE 1983
AMENDMENTS DO NOT APPLY HERE,
APPELLANTS' MERE UNSUPPORTED ALLEGATION
OF "GROSS NEGLIGENCE" IS NOT SUFFICIENT
TO OBVIATE THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT AND
OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY ACT.
Finally, giving the benefit of every doubt to

Appellants and assuming arguendo that Respondents are not
named in a representative capacity ami that the 1983
amendments to the Governmental Immunity Act do not apply
here, a careful review of the pre-1983 law compels the
conclusion that Appellants have still failed to state a
valid cause of action.
Appellants1 allegation in this action of "gross
negligence" is made in order to circumvent (1) the noticeof-claim requirement in U.C.A. 63-30-11 and (2) the
exclusive-remedy and no-personal-liability provisions of
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U.C.A. 63-30-4•

Before examining each of those sections, it

is important to emphasize the lack of support in Appellants'
Complaint for their gratuitous allegation of "gross
negligence," and the identical substance of this Complaint
and the Complaint in Madsen I, where no "gross negligence"
was alleged.

In paragraph 4 of the earlier Complaint,

Appellants listed nine statutory duties they claim
Respondents had under Title 7, and stated in paragraph 5:
Defendants have wholly failed to
discharge the duties and
responsibilities pleaded in # 4 above.
(R. supp.)
In the instant Complaint, the identical list of duties is
set out verbatim in paragraph 4, and paragraph 5 then
states:
Defendants have been grossly negligent
in that they have wholly failed to
discharge any of the duties and
responsibilities pleaded in # 4 above.
(R.5).
Mo additional facts are set forth as a basis for the new
allegation of "gross negligence."
So pleading is a transparent attempt by Appellants
to circumvent requirements of the Immunity Act and the
ruling in Madsen I by simply repeating the legal
catchword, "gross negligence."

This attempt to exalt form

over substance should not be abetted by the Court.

The

"substance of the pleading and the nature of the issues
• .

. raised" must control, rather than "the pleader's
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designation" of his action.

Lord v. Shaw, supra, 665

P.2d 1288, 1290 (Utah, 1983).

As this Court observed in

Madsen I, "An important legal consequence should not be at
the mercy of semantics."
(1)

658 P.2d at 631.

UtCtAt 63-3Q-11-

In order to skirt the claim requirement,
Appellants rely on the since-repealed second paragraph of
U.C.A. 63-30-11, providing that, if an action is commenced
against an employee but not against a governmental entity,
"service of the notice of claim upon the governmental entity
is required only if the entity has a statutory duty to
indemnify" the employee.

In support of their allegation

that the State would not have a duty to indemnify
Commissioners Borthick and Brimhall, Appellants rely on
U.C.A. 63-48-3(4) (also repealed in 1983):
No public entity is obligated to pay any
judgment based upon a claim against an
officer or employee if it is
.established that the officer or
employee acted or failed to act due to
gross negligence, fraud, or malice.
(Emphasis added.)
It is significant that, in order to nullify the
indemnification duty, gross negligence, fraud, or malice
must be established, presumably at a trial on the merits,
not merely alleged in a plaintiff's complaint.

By the

indemnification provisions, the Legislature intended "to
protect officers and employees of public entities from

-13-

personal liability arising from acts or omissions committed
. • . within the scope of their employment. . . ." (former
U.C.A. 63-48-1)•

It is inconceivable that the Legislature

intended such protection to be so ephemeral as to vanish at
the mere unsupported mention of "gross negligence" in a
plaintiff's complaint.
The Statefs duty to indemnify its employees is to
some extent linked to its representation of the employee, as
set forth in U.C.A. 63-48-3(2):
If the public entity conducts the
defense of the officer or employee
against the claim* then the public
entity shall pay any judgment based upon
or any compromise or settlement of the
claim except as provided in
subsections (3) or (4). . . . (Emphasis
added.)
In turn, if a public officer desires defense against "any
claim," he must request that the entity defend him and must
cooperate in the defense; unless he fails to do so, the
entity is obligated to defend him "against the claim*"
U.C.A. 63-48-3(1), and to "pay any judgment based upon . . .
the £laim . . . . " , U.C.A. 63-48-3(2) (emphasis added).
The important term, "claim," was statutorily defined as:
• • . any alleged personal legal
liability arising out of any act or
omission by any officer or employee

during the performance of his, duties
within the scope of hi*? employmentt or
unc?er color of authority*
U.C.A.
63-48-2(3) (emphasis added).
Thus, the focus of the pre-1983 indemnification provisions
-14-

was on whether the employee's conduct occurred within the
scope of employment: if so, the alleged liability
constituted a "claim," and the entity had a duty to defend
the employee (assuming a request and cooperation by the
employee), and to pay any judgment based on the claim.

The

question of whether "gross negligence" was involved had no
bearing upon the initial obligation to defend and
subsequently to indemnify the employee, unless the existence
of gross negligence was established by the finder of fact,
under U.C.A. 63-48-3(4).
As a matter of statutory construction, therefore,
the question of whether the State had a statutory duty to
indemnify Respondents, so as to require a notice of claim
under the former second paragraph of U.C.A. 63-30-11,
depends upon whether the conduct alleged was within the
scope of Respondents1 public employment, not whether
Appellants make an allegation of "gross negligence."

This

construction also makes eminently good common sense.
Whether an act or omission involved "gross negligence" is a
classic fact question which, in any disputed case, must be
resolved by the trier of fact.

No doubt recognition of

this fact, and a desire that an entity1s duty to indemnify
its employee not be avoided whenever a mere allegation of
gross negligence is made, led to the requirement in U.C.A.
63-48-3(4) that gross negligence be established in order
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for an entity to avoid its indemnification duty.

It would

make no sense at all for the notice-of-claim requirement to
depend on a determination of this purely factual question as
the initial step of litigation, prior to the filing of a
lawsuit or to opportunity by the parties to discover fully
the facts of the case.
A far more sensible course is to construe the
former second paragraph of U.C.A. 63-30-11 to require filing
a claim where the conduct alleged occurred "during the
performance of [the employee's] duties, within the scope of
his employment, or under color of authority," so as to
constitute a "claim" for which a public entity must provide
indemnification.

It is certainly true that some factual

determination is involved in deciding whether conduct was
during the performance of public duties, within the scope of
public employment, or under color of authority.

However, as

a practical matter, Respondents submit that in the vast
majority of cases, this determination can be far more
readily made at the initial stage of proceedings, when a
notice of claim must be filed, than can a largely subjective
determination as to whether an employee acted with "gross
negligence, fraud, or malice."
This interpretation is substantiated by the
clarifying amendment of U.C.A. 63-30-11 which the 1983
Legislature made (now codified as 63-30-11(2)):
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Any person having a claim for injury
against a governmental entity or against
an employee for an act or omission
occurring during the performance of his
duties, within the scope of employment,
or under color of authority shall,
before maintaining an action, file a
written notice of claim with such
entity.
As discussed in Point I-Bf supra. the
allegations in Appellants1 Complaint undeniably center on
acts or omissions occurring within the scope of Respondents1
employment as Commissioners of Financial Institutions and
during the performance of their official duties.

The State

has a palpably clear obligation to indemnify Respondents for
any judgment Appellants may eke out in this matter.

That

this is so was obvious from the time of the closure of Grove
Finance Company onward.

Appellants cannot void the

statutory notice requirement by a gratuitous allegation of
"gross negligence."
(2)

UtCA, 63-3Q-4-

Prior to 1983, the second paragraph of U.C.A.
63-30-4 provided that a remedy against a governmental entity
or employee was exclusive of any other action against an
employee, unless the employee acted with gross negligence,
fraud, or malice.

The third paragraph stated that no

employee may be held personally liable for acts "during the
performance of the employeefs duties, within the scope of
employment or under color of authority," unless gross
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negligence, fraud, or malice were established.

Again, the

clear contemplation seems to be that gross negligence,
fraud, or malice must have been established by the trier of
fact in the initial action against the entity or employee,
before a plaintiff may proceed with a separate additional
suit against the employee.

In any event, there is no

indication that the statutory standard of no liability for
public employees within the scope of employment was intended
to be obviated by a mere allegation of gross negligence, as
Appellants contend.

As set out supra. important legal

consequences should not depend upon the mere recitation of a
legal catch-phrase in a complaint.
Under U.C.A. 63-30-4, Appellants1 earlier action
against the State and a State official was their exclusive
remedy; they may not now have a second bite at the apple by
suing the same official and his predecessor for the same
damages claimed previously.
POINT II:
APPELLANTS1 ACTION WAS
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE IN MADSEN I
FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, AND IS NOW
BARRED BY RES JUDICATA.
In order for the doctrine of res judicata to apply
so as to bar a second action:
(1) the two cases must be between the
same parties or their privies; (2) there
must have been a final judgment on the
merits of the prior case; and (3) the
prior adjudication must have involved
the same issue or an issue that could or
should have been raised therein.
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Krofcheck v. Downev State Bank. 580
P.2d 243, 244 (Utah, 1978).
The doctrine applies with equal force to issues actually
adjudicated and to issues or claims which could have been
adjudicated in the earlier proceedings.

Church v. Meadow

Spring Rangh Corporationf lnc»# 659 p.2d 1045, 1048 (Utah,
1983); searle Brost v. Searle, 588 p.2d 689, 690 (Utah,
1978).
Apparently Appellants do not dispute that the
first and third Krofcheck criteria are met in this case.
As to (1), Commissioner Borthick was a named defendant in
the earlier case, and clearly a state official such as
Commissioner Brimhall is in privity with the State, which
was also a defendant in Madsen I (see 50 C.J.S., Judgments
796a, p. 335); the plaintiffs in the two cases are the same.
As to (3) precisely the same nucleus of operative fact is
alleged here as in Madsen I: in both cases, Appellants
seek to recover the full amount of their investment in Grove
Finance Company, plus interest, on the basis that officials
of the Department of Financial Institutions failed to
properly supervise or regulate the financial affairs of
Grove.

Appellants1 new allegations regarding gross

negligence and a duty to supervise under Title 70B are
merely statements of additional JLsaal grounds on which
Appellants hope to recover, based upon the same facts as in
Madsen I,

These additional legal issues could certainly
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have been raised in the earlier suit, were they viable; the
fact that Appellants chose not to do so does not defeat
application of res judicata.
Appellants do contend, however, that the earlier
dismissal of their action was not on the merits, being based
upon their failure to file a notice of claim, and so res
judicata does not apply (Appellant's Brief, pp. 4-8). This
misconstrues the basis of the Court's decision in the
earlier suit.
In Madsen I, this Court affirmed dismissal of
Appellants1 action against the State because no notice of
claim had been filed, and on the additional ground of
substantive immunity.

After concluding that the case

involved a "governmental function" to which the Immunity Act
applies, the Court continued:
Since the injury allegedly
suffered by plaintiffs resulted from
"the exercise of a governmental
function," the state is immune from suit
under § 63-30-3, unless immunity is
expressly waived in one of the
succeeding sections of the Governmental
Immunity Act. Section 63-30-10 waives
immunity for injuries caused by the
negligent act or omission of a
government employee (except those
arising out of "a discretionary
function"). While plaintiffs1
allegation that defendnt Borthick had
"wholly failed to discharge" his
statutory duties and responsibilities
might be construed as an allegation of a
negligent omission, plaintiffs expressly
disavowed that construction by

conceding in the flig.trict c<?nrt that
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their cause of action did not fall under
any of the statutory exceptions to
immunity.
They make no contrary
argument in this Court. For this
reasonf and because their cause of
action is barred in any case by the
notice of claim provision. . . we have
no occasion to rule upon whether
defendant Borthick's action constituted
"a negligent act or omission of an
employee" or involved a "discretionary
function" within the meaning of §
63-30-10. . . .
The dismissal of plaintiffs'
complaint against the State was proper

p.n. the .basis. of. .governmental. immunity
and noncompliance with the notice
requirement. 658 P.2d at 631-2
(emphasis added).
It is not contended by Appellants, nor could it
validly be, that dismissal of an action on grounds of
substantive immunity is not an adjudication on the merits to
which res judicata would apply.

Cf. Annapolis Urban

Renewal Authority v>..lnterJLinkf lnc«r 43 Md.App. 286, 405
A.2d 313 (1979), where the court held that a prior judgment
on the basis of sovereign immunity was a "judgment on the
merits" for res judicata purposes:
When a court dismisses an action because
of jurisdictional, procedural, or venue
problems, it is acting for reasons that
do not go to the substance of the case.

But, when a court decides that it
g.annct hear the case because of .a legal
defense such as sovereign immtfnityf.it
is deciding thatr as a,substantive
matterr the plaintiff cannot maintain
his cause of action*
• • •

[W]e believe that . . . a judgment based
upon the defense [of sovereign immunity]

is a judgment on the merits.
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id. at

318, 319 (emphasis added; see discussion
at 317-19)•
The Maryland court approvingly cited Bell v. Hood, 327
U.S.

678f 66 S.Ct. 773, 776 (1946):
Il]t is well settled that the failure to
state a proper cause of action calls for
a judgment on the merits and not for a
dismissal for want of jurisdiction. . .
If the court does . . • exercise its
jurisdiction to determine that the
allegations in the complaint do not
state a ground for relief, then
dismissal of the case would be on the
merits. . • . Cited 405 A.2d at 318.
It is worthy of note that the district court's

dismissal in Madsen I was with prejudice, "for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted."
628.

JL&. at

This distinguishes the instant case from Foil v.

Ballinaer, supra, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah, 1979), relied upon
by Appellants for the proposition that dismissal for failure
to comply with a notice-of-claim requirement (there, the
provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act) does not
constitute an adjudication on the merits. Appellants1
reliance ignores the status of the earlier dismissal in the
Foil case:

Because the [earlier] suit was
dismissed, without prejudice/ the
dismissal was not an adjudication on the
merits. 1&. at 149 (emphasis added).
It is also noteworthy that, in paragraph 9 of
their Complaint, Appellants allege that they discovered
their loss on July 18, 1980, when Grove Finance closed its

-22-

doors (R.5); and that Madsen I was dismissed by the
district court on May 14, 1981 (Appellants1 Brief, p. 3),
less than one year later.

Had the district court's

dismissal been solely based on a failure to file notice, the
appropriate course would have been a dismissal without
prejudice, since Appellants at that time were still within
the one-year notice period (U.C.A. 63-30-12), and could
still have filed a notice of claim.

That the district

court's action was also based on substantive immunity is
evident in its dismissal for failure to state a claim.
Moreover, even if substantive immunity were not
involved here, strong policy reasons favor considering
dismissal for failure to file timely notice a res judicata
bar to subsequent suits.

An analagous situation was

presented in Haefner Vt .CQtfnty Of, .Lancaster* 543 F.Supp.
264 (E.D. Pa., 1982), &££&. # 703 F.2d 550 (3d Cir., 1983).
Plaintiff Haefner brought a 1983 action against a city,
county, and public officials, alleging a conspiracy to
secure a criminal prosecution against him.

The federal

court dismissed Haefnerfs first suit because it was timebarred under the applicable Pennsylvania statute of
limitation, aaefner Vt..CQwnty of Lancaster * 520 F.supp.
131 (E.D. Pa., 1981), a££&-# 681 F.2d 806 (3d Cir., 1982).
Haefner then brought a second suit, naming one additional
individual defendant not named in the first suit, and adding
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allegations concerning additional false charges and failure
to expunge his record, 543 F.Supp. at 266. Finding first
that the same parties were involved in both cases, the court
continued:
We have equally little trouble finding
that the second required element, a
final, valid judgment on the merits, is

met. A .dismissal for .failure, to, .state
a claim is a "judgment on .the, merits."
[citation omitted]

Likewise, dismissal

9f a suit, as.time-barred establishes a
res judicata bai*
[citation omitted]
JL&.
(Emphasis added.)
Similarly, in the instant matter, dismissal of Appellants1
suit for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted must be deemed a final judgment on the merits,
supporting application of res judicata.
The sound policy bases for applying the previous
judgment under res judicata to this case are evident.

If

the instant action were allowed, any plaintiff, having
suffered an adverse ruling in an action against a state
agency, could bring another action based on the same facts
against any agency employee involved with the alleged loss.
Presumably the number of successive suits which could be
brought on that basis would be limited only by the
plaintiff's tenacity and the number of separate employees
who could be linked in any way to a purported loss.

All of

the elements of res judicata are present here, and the
district court1s ruling in this case should be affirmed.
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POINT III: THIS ACTION IS BARRED BY THE
THREE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONf U.C.A.
78-12-26(4), AND THE DISTRICT COURT'S
ORDER SHOULD ALSO BE AFFIRMED ON THIS
BASIS.
As previously noted, in paragraph 9 of their
Complaint Appellants aver that they did not discover
Respondents1 alleged negligence until July 18, 1980, when
Grove Finance was taken into receivership by the State
(R.5).

Complaint in the instant matter was filed on July

20, 1983 (Appellants1 Brief/ pp. 2, 4 ) . This would appear
to be three years and two days after the latest date when a
cause of action may be deemed to have arisen.
In Madsen I, 658 P.2d at 631, n. 7, this Court
indicated in dicta that the statute of limitation which
would apply in this case is U.C.A. 78-12-26(4), which
provides a three-year limitation on an action "for a
liability created by the statutes of this statef other than
for a penalty or forfeiture. . . ."

The instant action is

thus barred as untimely.
Appellants argue that U.C.A. 78-12-40 saves their
suit (Appellants Brief, pp. 10-12).

The statutory language

itself belies that contention:

If.any agtlpn uj& .cpmmengefl within flue

time and . . . the plaintiff fails in
such action or upon a cause of action
otherwise than upon the merits, and the
time limited either by law or contract
for commencing the same shall have
expired, the plaintiff . . . may
commence a new action within one year
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after the reversal or failure.
(Emphasis added.)
Thus, the operation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 is
contingent upon the action initially having been commenced
in a timely and proper manner; the section does not
operate as a cure-all for failures to comply with conditions
precedent to filing earlier suits. Foil v. Ballinaer.
£UE£&, indicates that Section 78-12-40 does not apply
here; in that case, the Court found that the plaintiff could
refile her action within one year jJL the first action had
been properly "commenced" as that term is used in section
78-12-40.

601 P.2d at 149 (emphasis added).

Heref

Appellants1 initial action was never properly "commenced
within due time" (i.e., within one year of denial of an
appropriate notice of claim, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12,
-15), and may not now be resurrected by Section 78-12-40.

CONCLUSION
Commissioner Borthick and Commissioner Brimhall
are named defendants in this action in their capacity as
former Commissioners of Financial Institutions of the State
of Utah for acts or omissions which occurred during the
performance of their official duties, within the scope of
that employment, and under color of authority.

Under the

Court's decision in the first Madsen v. Borthick, because
the State is not subject to suit, neither are Respondents.
Furthermore, Appellants have never filed a notice of claim
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under U.C.A. 63-30-11, and their suit is barred under either
the 1983 or pre-1983 version of that statute. Appellants1
gratuitous allegations of "gross negligence" have no
substance and do not change that result.
In addition, both the doctrine of res judicata, in
light of the ruling in Madsen I, and the applicable
statute of limitation, U.C.A. 78-12-26(4), bar this action.
Respondents pray tht the order of the district
court granting summary judgment in their favor be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this

day of April,

1984.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
PAUL M. WARNER
Assistant Attorney General
Chief, Litigation Division
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211 SHE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD D. MADSEN and
NANCY MADSEN, his wife,
BOYD A. SWENSEN and
BEATRICE SWENSEN, his
Wife, EOPE A HILTON,
BLAINE ANDERSON and
SHEREE ANDfRSON, his
wife, CYNTHIA HILTON,
RALPH M. HILTON,
MIDDLE EAST FOUNDATION
and GENE A HELLAND,
on behalf of themselves
and all others aimilarly
aituated,

C O M P L A I N T

Civil No.

C&/-/79/?

Plaintiffs,
vs.
MIRVIN D. BORTKICK, Commissioner
of the Utah Department, of
Financial Institutions; and
tha STATE OF UTAH
Defendants.

On behalf of themselves and all others aimilarly
aituated, plaintiffa allege:
PASTIES AND RELATED ENTITIES
1.

Plaintiffs are each depositors in Grove Finance

2.

Defendant Mirvin D. Borthick ia tha Commissioner

Company.

of the Utah Department of Financial Institutions.
3.

Grove Finance Company ia a Utah corporation

transecting a banking business within the Stata of Utah within
tha meaning of S 7*3-1 U.C.A. in thatGrova Finance Company
holds itself out to the public aa receiving money on deposit
within the meaning of $ 7-3-3 U.C.A.

PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE 0F ACTION
4*

Defendant Mirvin D. Borthick and the defendant

State of Utah bad a duty to inspect and supervise the financial
integrity of Grove Finance Company within the aeaning of
f 7-1*7 O.C.A.

In particular, defendants bad a duty to do the

following:
A.

Visit and examine every banking business at least

once each year within the aeaning of S 7-1-8 U.C.A.
B.

At the time of each annual vialt to inquire into

the condition and resources of the institution examined, the
aode of conducting and managing its affairs, the official
actions of its directors and officers, the investment and
disposition of its funds, the security offered to members and
whether or not it was violating any provisions of law within
the aeaning of S 7-1-8 U.C.A.
C.

Notify the board of directora of any banking

business in writing if any officer or employee of that bank was
found to be dishonest, reckless or incompetent or failed to
perform any duty of his office within the aeaning of S 7-1-13
U.C.A.
D.

Jtequire the board of directora of each banking

business to examine the affairs of the institution with a
special purpose of ascertaining the value and security thereof
within the aeaning of S 7-1-14 U.C.A.
2.

Call for not lass than four reports each year

concerning the condition of each banking business and to certify
such report for publication within the aeaning of f 7-1-17 U.C.A.
F.

Call for apecial reports as aay be necessary for

the protection of the public within the aeaning of S 7-1-18 U.C.A.
6.

Inform the county attorney of any violation of any

provision of law which constitutes a misdemeanor or felony by any
officer, director or employee of any banking business within the
aeaning of f 7-1-23 U.C.A.

8.

Refuse to grant approval for the filing of articles

of incorporation of any banking business when the plan of
operation does not comply with the lavs of this state vithin
the meaning of S 7*1-26 U.C.A.
2.

Take possesion of the business and property of

any banking business vfaich is conducting its business in an
unauthorised or unsafe manner vithin the meaning of S 7-2-1 U.C.A.
5.

Defendants have vholly failed to discharge the

duties and responsibilities pleaded in I 4 above.
C.

Plaintiffs reasonably believed that defendants had

discharged the duties and responsibilities pleaded in f 4 above.
7*

Plaintiffs relied upon defendants to inspect and

supervise Grove Finance Company as pleaded in I 4 above? and in
reliance thereon, plaintiffs have each deposited or placed
substantial sums of money vith Grove Finance Company.
8.

Grove Finance Company has vholly failed to meet

the requirements set up by Utah lav# viz., $ 7-3-1 et seq. U.C.A.
As a result thereof, Grove Finance Company has become insolvent.
9.

By reason of the insolvency of Grove Finance

Company, the named plaintiffs have lost substantial sums of
money, the exact amount of vhich cannot be ascertained prior to
discovery.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
10.

This action is brought by plaintiffs as a class

action on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly
situated under the provisions of Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
11.

The class consists of all persons, or other entities,

vhohave deposited funds vith Grove Finance Company# a Utah
corporation, vith its principal place of business in Utah County.
12.

The exact number of class members is not known, but

plaintiffs allege on information end belief that there are in
excess of one thousand members.

The class is so numerous that

joinder of individual members herein is impracticable.
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13. There art common question, o f

^

law

^ ^

fast

class members; mamely, whether tha Stat* o f „ t a h p r o p e r l y , u p e r .
TJ**3

MB3

Jj3jep»rt*3 'Grey* TJjgjuoPf Caapsjjy^

14. Th. claims of plaintiffs Vh 0 are representatives
of tha class herein ara typical of tha c*alffl, o f
that tha claias of tha named plaintiffs ^

the c l a „ ln
th9

t h e clalffi8 o f

class member, each arise by reason of a W i n g relationship
with Grove Finance Company. There is no

„ between any

TOnfllct

ladividually-naaed plaintiffs and other w ^ . o £
respect to this action or with respect t<> tht

thm

cl

c iais» f o r

„8

wlth

ralief

herein set forth.
15. The named plaintiffs will f a i r l y

a d equ ately

u d

protect the interests of the class.
16. This action is properly »*. intained

M

a

class

action for the following reasons1
A. The prosecution of separate

action,

members of the class would create a risk o £

^ individual
adjudications

varving

with raspect to individual •ember, of th^ c l a a g ^Ldh
establish incompatible standards of cond^ct

would

for the defendant

herein which opposes the class.
B. The prosecution of separate a c t i o n , ^

individual

members of the class would create a risk o f adjudications with
respect to individual members of the cla^, ^ ^

^^^

practical matter be dispositive of the i*> tarastg

of

•amber, not parties to the adjudications, o r

wuld

M

a

&• other

SUb«tantially

impair or impede their ability to protec^ t h 8 l r interests.
C. The questions of law and tKet

comon

^ ^m members

cf the class predominate ever any questic,nt affecting only
individual members* and a class action ia auperior to other
available methods for the fair and effici, Bt adjudication of the
controversy.
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WHEREFORE, plaintiffs demand that defendants reimburse
•aeh class member for the monies plus Interest received by
Crove Finance Company for each such class member. The exact
•mount of such recovery to be determined after completion of
class certification and discovery.
BATED this

£ n d - a»v o f Marc,

l m #

kOBERT J. DEBRY

/

Attorney for Plaintiffs
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APPENDIX B

ROBERT J. DEBRY
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Plaintiff
965',East 4800 South, Suite 2
Salt Lake City, Utah, 64117
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD D. MADSEN and NANCY
his wife, BOYD A.
SWENSEN and BEATRICE SWENSEN,
his wife, BLAINE ANDERSON and
SHEREE ANDERSON, his wife,
HOPE A.. HILTON, CYNTHIA
HILTON, RALPH M. HILTON, GENE
HELLAND and the MIDDLE EAST
MADSEN,

COMPLAINT
fClass Action)

FOUNDATION,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
MIRVIN D. BORTHICK, W. SMOOT
BRIMHALL, and JOHN DOES I to
V, being former Commissioners
of the Utah Department of
Financial Institutions,
Defendants.
COME NOW the plaintiffs for themselves and all others
similarly situated and allege as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs were each

depositors

in Grove

Finance

Company.
2.

John Does I through V are persons whose identities

•*e not presently known.

However, they are former Commission-

ers of- the Utah Department of financial Institutions.

This

allegation includes each commissioner who has held office from

the incorporation of Grove Finance to the insolvency of Grove
Finance.

As these identities are determined

plaintiffs

will

amend

this

complaint

and

by

discovery,

insert

the true

identities.
3.

Grove Finance Company was a Utah corporation trans-

acting a banking business within the State of Utah within the
meaning of §7-3-1, U.C.A. in that Grove Finance Company held
itself out to the public as receiving money on deposit within
the meaning of $7-3-3 U.C.A.
PLAINTIFFS* CAUSE OF ACTION
4.

John Does i' -through V and the Defendant Mirvin D.

Borthick and .W. Smoot Brimhall had a duty to inspect and
supervise the financial integrity of Grove Finance
within the meaning of $7-1-7 U.C.A.

Company

In particular, defendants

had a duty to do the following:
A.

Visit and examine every banking business at
least

once each year within

the

meaning

of

$7-1-8 U.C.A.
B.

At the time of each annual visit to inquire into
the condition and resources of the institution
examined, the mode of conducting and managing
its affairs/, the official actions of its directors and officers, the investment and disposition

of

its

funds, the

security

offered to

members and whether or not it was violating any
provisions of law within the meaning of $7-l~8
U.C.A.

2

Notify the Board of Directors of any banking
business in vriting if any officer or employee
of that bank vas found to be dishonest, reckless
or incompetent or railed to perform any duty of
his office vithin the meaning of §7-1-13, U.C.A.
Require the Board of Directors of each banking
business to examine the affairs of the institution vith a special purpose of ascertaining the
value and security thereof vithin the meaning of
$7-1-14, U.C.A.
Call for not less than four reports each year
concerning the condition of each banking business and to certify such report for publication
vithin the meaning of S7-1-17 U.C.A.
Call for special reports as may be necessary for
the protection of the public vithin the meaning
of S7-1-18, U.C.A.
Inform the county attorney of any violation of
any provision of lav vhich constitutes a misdemeanor or felony by any officer, director or
employee of any banking 'business vithin the
meaning of $7-1-23 U.C.A.
Refuse to grant approval for the filing of
articles of incorporation of any banking business when the plan of operation does not comply
vith the lavs of this state vithin the meaning
of $7-1-26 U.C.A.

3

I.

Take possession of the business and property of
any banking business which is conducting its
business in an unauthorized or unsafe manner
within the meaning of $7-2-1 U.C.A.

5.
have

Defendants have been grossly negligent in that they

wholly

failed

to

discharge

any

of

the

duties

and

responsibilities pleaded in 44 above.
6.

Plaintiffs reasonably believed that Defendants had

discharged the duties and responsibilities pleaded in #4 above.
7.

Plaintiffs

relied

upon

defendants

to

inspect

and

supervise Grove Finance Company as pleaded in #4 above; and in
reliance thereon, plaintiffs have «ach deposited

or placed

substantial sums of money with Grove Finance Company.
8.

Grove Finance Company has wholly failed to meet the

requirements set up by Utah Law, viz., $7-3-1 et seg. U.C.A.
As a result thereof. Grove Finance Company has become insolvent.
9.

Plaintiffs did not discover the defendants' gross

negligence until on or about July 18, 1980, when Grove Finance
was forced to close its doors. Plaintiffs could not reasonably
have learned of the defendants' gross negligence at any earlier
time because the plaintiffs did not have access to any of the
defendants'

reports

or

work

product.

Furthermore,

the

defendants lulled the plaintiffs by giving periodic reports
that no problems existed with Grove Finance.
10.

By reason of the insolvency of Grove Finance Company,

the named Plaintiffs have lost their deposits in Grove Finance

A

except that the bankruptcy

court has or will pay

a small

dividend on the loss.
PLAINTIFFS1 ALTERNATIVE CAUSE OF ACTION
H„

If

Grove

Finance

is

not

transacting

a

"banking

business" within the meaning of 57*3-1, Utah Code Ann,, then it
is a "regulated lender" within the meaning of S70B-3-501 Utah
Code Ann,
12.

Defendants had a duty to investigate the financial

responsibility of Grove Finance prior to issuing a license.
(J70B-3-503

(2) U.C.A.)

Defendants failed to make any such

investigation.
13.

Defendants

had

a duty to examine periodically at

intervals the loans, business, and records of Grove Finance.
Defendants failed to make any such examination (S70B-3-506(1)
Utah Code Ann.)
14.
Finance.

Defendants had a duty to revoke the license of Grove
(S70B-3-504, Utah Code Ann.)

Defendants did not make

any timely revocation.
15.

Plaintiffs relied upon the defendants to make timely

investigations, examinations, and revocations.

If Defendants

had made any investigation, examination, or timely revocation
as alleged above, the Plaintiffs would not have deposited their
funds in Grove Finance; or, in the alternative, plaintiffs
brould have withdrawn their funds from Grove Finance.
16.

Grove

Finance

has

become

insolvent

because

of

improper conduct that would have been uncovered by any timely
investigation or examination.

17.

By reason of the insolvency of Grove Finance, the

Plaintiffs

have

lost

their

deposits, except

that

a small

dividend has been or will be paid on deposits by the bankruptcy
court.
18.
have

Defendants have been grossly negligent in that they

wholly

failed

to

discharge

any

of

the

duties

and

responsibilities pleaded above•
19.

Plaintiffs did not discover the defendants9

gross

negligence until on or about July 18, 1980, when Grove Finance
was forced to close its doors•

Plaintiffs could not reasonably

have learned of the defendants9 gross negligence at any earlier
time because the plaintiffs did not have access to any of the
defendants1

reports

or

work

product*

Furthermore,

the

defendants lulled the plaintiffs by giving periodic reports
that no problems existed with Grove Finance.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment against defendants
as follows:
1*
plus

For the amount of deposits made to Grove Finance,

accrued

Interest,

bankruptcy court*

and

minus

any

dividends

from

the

The exact amount is not presently known.

However, plaintiffs will seek leave of court to amend the

6

complaint when discovery is completed.
2.

For such other and further relief as the court deems

just and proper.
DATED this Jlz

day of CJk^JL.

, 1983.

ROBERT J^ DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
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APPENDIX C
STATUTES CITED

IKC.A. 63-30-4 (prior to 1983):
Nothing contained in this act,
unless specifically provided, is to be
construed as an admission or denial of
liability or responsibility in so far as
governmental entities ar concerned.
Wherein immunity from suit is waived by
this act, consent to be sued is granted
and liability of the entity shall be
determined as if the entity were a
private person.
The remedy against a governmental
entity or its employee for an injury
caused by an act or omission which
occurs during the performance of such
employeefs duties, within the scope of
employment, or under color of authority
is, after the effective date of this
act, exclusive of any other civil action
or proceeding by reason of the same
subject matter against the employee or
the estate of the employee whose act or
omission gave rise to the claim, unless
the employee acted or failed to act
through gross negligence, fraud, or
malice.
An employee may be joined in an
action against a governmental entity in
a representative capacity if the act or
omission complained of is one for which
the governmental entity may be liable,
but no employee shall be held personally
liable for acts or omissions occurring
during the performance of the employee1s
duties, within the scope of employment
or under color of authority, unless it
is established that the employee acted
or failed to act due to gross
negligence, fraud or malice.

U.C.A. 63-30-4 (as amended by 1983 Legislature):
(1) Nothing contained in this
chapter, unless specifically provided,
shall be construed as an admission or
denial of liability or responsibility in
so far as governmental entities or their
employees are concerned. If immunity
from suit is waived by this chapter,
consent to be sued is granted and
liability of the entity shall be
determined as if the entity were a
private person.
(2) Nothing in this chapter shall
be construed as adversely affecting any
immunity from suit which a governmental
entity or employee may otherwise assert
under state or federal law.
(3) The remedy against a
governmental entity or its employee for
an injury caused by any act or omission
which occurs during the performance of
such employeefs dutiesf within the scope
of employmentf or under color of
authorty is, after the effective date of
this act, exclusive of any other civil
action or proceeding by reason of the
same subject matter against the employee
or the estate of the employee whose act
or omission gave rise to the claim,
unless the employee acted or failed to
act through fraud or malice.
(4) An employee may be joined in an
action against a governmental entity in
a representative capacity if the act or
omission complained of is one for which
the governmental entity may be liable,
but no employee may be held personally
liable for acts or omissions occurring
during the performance of the employee's
duties, within the scope of employment
or under color of authority, unless it
is established that the employee acted
or failed to act due to fraud or malice.
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U.C.A. 63-30-10 (prior to 1982 amendment):
Immunity from suit of all governmental
entities is waived for injury proximately
caused by a negligent act or omission of an
employee committed within the scope of his
employment except if the injury:
(1) arises out of the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function, whether or
not the discretion is abused, or
(2) arises out of assault, battery,
false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious
prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of
process, libel, slander, deceit, interference
with contract rights, infliction of mental
anguish, or civil rights, or
(3) arises out of the issuance, denial,
suspension, or revocation of, or by the
failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or
revoke, any permit, license, certificate,
approval, order, or similar authorization,
or
(4) arises out of a failure to make an
inspection, or by reason of making an
inadequate or negligent inspection of any
property, or
(5) arises out of the institution or
prosecution of any judicial or administrative
proceeding, even if malicious or without
probable cause, or
(6) arises out of a misrepresentation by
said employee whether or not such is
negligent or intentional, or
(7) arises out of or results from riots,
unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations,
mob violence and civil disturbance, or
(8) arises out of or in connection with
the collection of and assessment of taxes,
or
(9) arises out of the activities of the
Utah National Guard, or
(10) arises out of the incarceration of
any person in any state prison, county or
city jail or other place of legal confinment,
or
(11) arises from any natural condition on
state lands or the result of any activity
authorized by the state land board.
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U.C.A. 64-30-11 (prior to 1983):
Any person having a claim for
injury to person or property against a
governmental entity or its employee
shall, before maintaining an action
under this act, file a written notice of
claim with such entity for appropriate
relief including money damages. The
notice of claim shall set forth a brief
statement of the facts and the nature of
the claim asserted, shall be signed by
the person making the claim or such
persons1s agent, attorney, parent or
legal guardian, and shall be directed
and delivered to the responsible
governmental entity within the time
prescribed in section 63-30-12 or
63-30-13, as applicable.
Service of the notice of claim upon
an employee of a governmental entity is
not a condition precedent to the
commencement of an action or special
proceeding against such person. If an
action or special proceeding is
commenced against the employee, but not
against the governmental entity, service
of the notice of claim upon the
governmental entity is required only if
the entity has a statutory duty to
indemnify such person.
If the claimant is under the age of
majority, or mentally incompetent and
without a legal guardian, or imprisoned
at the time the cause of action accrued,
the court, in its discretion, may extend
the time for service of notice of claim,
but in no event shall it grant an
extension which exceeds the general
statutory period of limitation
applicable to the cause of action. In
determining whether to grant an
extension, the court shall consider
whether the delay in serving the notice
of claim will substantially prejudice
the governmental entity in maintaining
its defense on the merits.
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U.C.A. 63-30-11 (as amended by 1983 Legislature):
(1) A claim is deemed to arise
when the statute of limitations that
would apply if the claim were against a
private person commences to run.
(2) Any person having a claim for
injury against a governmental entity or
against an employee for an act or
omission occurring during the
performance of his duties, within the
scope of employment, or under color of
authority shall, before maintaining an
action, file a written notice of claim
with such entity.
(3) The notice of claim shall set
forth a brief statement of the facts,
the nature of the claim asserted, and
the damages incurred by the claimant so
far as they are known, shall be signed
by the person making the claim or such
person 1 s agent, attorney, parent or
legal guardian, and shall be directed
and delivered to the responsible
governmental entity in the manner and
within the time prescribed in section
63-30-12 or 63-30-13, as applicable.
(4) If, at the time the claim
arises, the claimant is under the age of
majority, or mentally incompetent and
without a legal guardian, or imprisoned,
upon application by the claimant and
after hearing and notice to the
governmental entity the court, in its
discretion, may extend the time for
service of notice of claim, but in no
event shall it grant an extension which
exceeds the applicable statute of
limitations. In determining whether to
grant an extension, the court shall
consider whether the delay in serving
the notice of claim will substantially
prejudice the governmental entity in
maintaining its defense on the merits.
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U.C.A. 63-30-12 (prior to 1983):
A claim against the state is barred
unless notice of claim is filed with the
attorney general and the agency
concerned within one year after the
cause of action arises.
U.C.A. 63-30-12 (as amended by 1983 Legisalture):
A claim against the state or its
employee for an act or omission
occurring during the performance of his
duties, within the scope of employment,
or under color of authority, is barred
unless notice of claim is filed with the
attorney general and the agency
concerned within one year after the
claim arises, or before the expiration
of any extension of time granted under
subsection 63-30-11(4).
U.C.A. 63-30-15 (prior to 1983):
If the claim is denied, a claimant
may institute an action in the district
court against the governmental entity in
those circumstances where immunity from
suit has been waived as in this act
provided. Said action must be commenced
within one year after denial or the
denial period as specified herein.
U.C.A. 63-30-15 (as amended by 1983 Legislature):
If the claim, is denied, a claimant
may institute an action in the district
court against the governmental entity in
those circumstances in which immunity
from suit has been waived in this
chapter. The action must be commenced
within one year after denial or the
denial period as specified in this
chapter.
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U.C.A. 63-30-36 (enacted by 1983 Legislature):
(1) Before a governmental entity
may defend its employee against a claimf
the employee must make a written request
to the governmental entity to defend him
and must make it within ten days after
service of process upon him or within
such longer period as would not
prejudice the governmental entity in
maintaining a defense on his behalf, or
conflict with notice requirements
imposed on the entity in connection with
insurance carried by the entity relating
to the risk involved. If the employee
fais to make a request or fails to
reasonably cooperate in the defense, the
governmental entity is not required to
defend or continue to defend the
employee, nor pay any judgment,
compromise, or settlement against the
employee in respect to the claim.
(2) If a governmental entity
conducts the defense of an employee, the
governmental entity shall pay any
judgment based upon or any compromise or
settlement of the claim except as
provided in subsection (3).
(3) A governmental entity may
conduct the defense of an employee under
an agreement with the employee that the
government entity reserves the right not
to pay the judgment, compromise, or
settlement unless it is established that
the claim rose out of an act or omission
occurring during the performance of his
duties, within the scope of his
employment, or under color of authority.
U.C.A. 63-48-1 (repealed by 1983 Legislature):
The purpose of this act is to
protect officers and employees of public
entities from personal liability arising
from acts or omissions committed during
the performance of their duties, within
the scope of their employment, or under
color of authority.
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U.C.A. 63-48-2(3) (repealed by 1983 Legislature):
As used in this act:
•

• •

(3) "Claim11 means any alleged
personal legal liability arising out of
any act or omission by any officer or
employee during the performance of his
duties, within the scope of his
employment, or under color of authority.
U.C.A. 63-48-3 (repealed by 1983 Legislature):
(1) If any officer ro employee
desires the public entity to defend him
against any claim, the officer or
employee shall request the public entity
in writing to do defend him not later
than ten days after service of process
upon him in respect to the claim. If
the officer or employee fails to make
such request of the public entity, or if
the officer or employee fails to
reasonably co-operate in the defense of
the claim, then the public entity is not
obligated to defend the officer or
employee against the claim or continue
this defense in case of such failure to
co-operate, nor pay any judgment,
compromise, or settlement in respect to
the claim.
(2) If the public entity conducts
the defense of the officer or employee
against the claim, then the public
entity shall pay any judgment based upon
or any compromise or settlement of the
claim except as provided in subsections
(3) or (4) of this section.
(3) In connection with the defense
of the officer or employee against a
claim, the public entity may conduct the
defense under an agreement with that
officer or employee to the effect that
the public entity reserves the right not
to pay the judgment, compromise, or
settlement until it is established that
the claim arose out of an act or
omission occurring during the
performance of his duties, within the
scope of his employment, or under color
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of authority.
(4) No public entity is obligated
to pay any judgment based upon a claim
against an officer or employee if it is
established that the officer or employee
acted or failed to act due to gross
negligence, fraud, or malice.
(5) Nothing in this section
authorizes a public entity to pay such
part of a claim or judgment as is for
punitive or exemplary damages.
U.C.A. 63-48-4 (repealed by 1983 Legislature):
(1) Subject to subsection (2) of
this section, if an officer or employee
pays any judgment entered against him,
or any portion of it, which the public
entity is required to pay under section
63-48-3, the officer or employee is
entitled to recover the amount of such
payment and the costs of his defense
from the public entity.
(2) If the public entity does not
conduct the defense of an officer or
employee against a claim or does conduct
this defense under an agreement as
provided in subsection 3 of section
63-48-3, the officer or employee may
recover from the public entity under
subsection (1) of this section only if:
(a) He establishes that the act or
omission upon which the judgment is
based occurred during the performance of
his duties, within the scope of his
employment, or under color of authority
and that he conducted the defense of the
claim against him in good faith; and
(b) The public entity fails to
establish that the officer or employee
acted or failed to act due to gross
negligence, fraud, or malice.
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U.C.A. 78-12-26(4):
Within three years:
•

• •

(4) An action for a liability
created by the statutes of this state,
other than for a penalty or forfeiture
under the laws of this state, except
where in speical cases a different
limitation is prescribed by the statutes
of this state.
U.C.A. 78-12-40:
If any action is commenced within
due time and a judgment thereon for the
plaintiff is reversed, or if the
plaintiff fails in such action or upon a
cause of action otherwise than upon the
merits, and the time limited, either by
law or contract for commencing the same
shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if
he dies and the cause of action
survives, his representatives, may
commence a new action within one year
after the reversal or failure.
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